Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi speaks at the groundbreaking ceremony of a Hindu temple in Ayodhya, Aug. 5.
Photo: -/Agence France-Presse/Getty ImagesIndian Prime Minister Narendra Modi didn’t only lay the cornerstone of a new Hindu temple last week. He was also setting the foundation for a new order in the Indo-Pacific: one in which India will have a closer relationship with countries like the U.S., Japan and Australia, but in which Hindu-Muslim and India-Pakistan tensions will complicate efforts in Washington and Beijing to keep U.S.-China relations from spiraling out of control.
Mr. Modi’s many critics in India and the West have focused on the domestic consequences of India’s turn to Hindu nationalism—sometimes called “saffron politics”—which could alienate, marginalize and even endanger the approximately 182 million Muslims, 30 million Christians and other religions minority groups in India. These concerns are not baseless. The number of attacks on Christians has grown dramatically in recent years, while a range of legislation directed at Muslims stokes fears that India’s largest minority could be relegated to second-class status.
The rise of Hindu nationalism is not only a response to domestic pressures. Beijing is challenging New Delhi by sea and land, from the Indian Ocean to the mountains of Kashmir. This country of about 1.4 billion people and 22 languages needs an idea around which it can rally as it summons the energy for the contest. The stale Nehruvian mix of secularism and socialism has lost its mass appeal. Mr. Modi’s saffron politics has its drawbacks, but there is no realistic alternative in India today.
Yet if Hindu nationalism helps Mr. Modi assemble the political power needed to make India great, it comes with a price: the intensification of India’s rivalry with Pakistan and the deepening of Pakistan-China ties in response. Pakistan has long sought to undermine New Delhi’s rule over the majority-Muslim Jammu and Kashmir region. India’s decision last year to strip the region of its semi-independent status fulfilled a longtime demand of Hindu nationalists, but it also increased the danger that Pakistan will infiltrate terrorists or arm Kashmiri resistance groups.
To block this, India must bolster its defenses along the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-administered areas. But Beijing also controls part of Kashmir, and Indian buildups in this strategic area threaten Chinese territorial interests as well as the security of transit lines on the China Pakistan Economic Corridor that come close to the Line of Control. Beijing does not intend to let New Delhi dominate the contested region, and this summer’s border clashes could be a sign of more trouble to come.
India historically has responded to Pakistani meddling in Kashmir with support for rebel groups in Pakistan, notably in the tumultuous province of Balochistan. China seeks to turn the strategically located Balochi port of Gwadar into a major sea and rail hub. Balochi independence fighters recently announced that they intended to prioritize Chinese interests and citizens in their violent independence campaign. This is unlikely to end well for anyone.
Hindu nationalist policies also increase India-China tensions in the northeast. In recent decades, Muslim migrants from Bangladesh have moved to India in search of better lives. In India’s restive northeast, local populations see these migrants as rivals for resources. Hindutva politicians—India’s hard-line nationalists—have long called for tough action against such migrants, and the Modi government has obliged. Along with other anti-immigrant measures, a recent purge of the citizenship rolls in the northeastern state of Assam left almost two million people—mostly Muslims—in legal limbo. Mr. Modi has told migrants who came later than Bangladesh’s 1971 War of Independence to “be prepared with their bags packed.”
This is a popular line with many Indians, but has led to a significant worsening of normally friendly Indian-Bangladeshi relations. Bangladesh, already struggling to manage the influx of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, has no desire to absorb large numbers from India. China, always on the lookout for opportunities in the region, has been quick to offer the Bangladeshis assistance, investment and support.
For U.S. strategists, saffron India’s militancy is both a significant asset and a major headache. On the positive side, America’s task of building a regional coalition to balance Beijing’s power becomes much easier if India has a stable governing party that is willing and able to focus on the China threat.
But there is another side to the story. Ever since the Corcyraeans and Corinthians drove a reluctant Athens and Sparta into the Peloponnesian War, the danger that hotheaded allies can drag their superpower patrons into local conflicts has been a major factor in international life. Beijing cannot allow Pakistan to collapse without massive blows to its prestige and interests. Washington cannot easily allow India to suffer humiliation at the hands of its enemies. That gives both India and Pakistan leverage over their allies, and increases the obstacles for American strategists looking to stabilize the Asian balance of power while minimizing the risk of a U.S.-China war.
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